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Chapter 14
Credit Implications of the Payout
Annuity Market
Arthur Fliegelman, Moshe Arye Milevsky, and Scott A. Robinson
As baby boomers gradually shift from the asset accumulation to the
distribution phase of their lifecycle, competition between insurance
companies, mutual funds, and banks to control these substantial assets
will intensify. The penalty for not offering products that meet retirees’
demands is the potential loss of sizable asset pools. To offset this risk, US life
insurers can take advantage of their unique ability to offer longevity insur-
ance through payout annuities, if they are to maximize their asset retention.
Payout annuities are annuity contracts that make regular, periodic income
payouts to the annuitant at some predetermined point in time after the
purchase of the contract.
This chapter focuses on the risks and opportunities for insurers when
they convert qualified retirement or other saving into guaranteed payout
streams. The consequent annuity payments can either be fixed in amount,
or they can vary with the performance of underlying investments. Variable
immediate annuities (VIA), which are payout annuities with funds usually
invested in equities, have gained in popularity in recent years. Products
such as these can transfer any of a variety of risks, from the individual to the
insurer which, depending on the product, may include longevity, interest
rate, credit, equity market fluctuations, and inflation risk. Benefiting from
the ‘‘law of large numbers,’’ in conjunction with creative product design,
insurance companies can mitigate many of the risks they assume in offering
these contracts.
For an insurer to make a profit on the product, however, the company
almost certainly must retain some risk elements. Given the potential size of
the retirement market and the increasing complexity of the related insur-
ance product guarantees, an understanding of these products’ potential
risks to the offeror is essential to evaluating their financial position.
Our objective, therefore, is to explore the credit implications of assorted
guarantees made by insurance companies offering payout annuity products
in the retirement income market. As part of our analysis, we use a pricing
model to quantify the risks to profitability (and solvency) from unexpected
increases in longevity. Our modeling shows that future mortality improve-
ments can have a material impact on companies with significant exposure
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to payout annuities. That said, we believe that the market offers substantial
opportunity for the industry to attract new assets while meeting the financial
needs of retirees.
Credit Risk in the Retirement Income Market
A brief look at recent insurance company failures in the United States helps
illustrate the key these risks facing insurers and the role they play in the
payout annuity market.
History of US Insurance Company Failures
The 1983 insolvency of Baldwin-United, a significant provider of single
premium deferred annuities (SPDA), brought the issue of life insurance
solvency to the attention of the general public. Though considered an annu-
ity from a legal and regulatory perspective, the SPDA, acts economically
more like a tax-deferred savings account or certificate of deposit. Though
SPDA contracts almost always permit the contract holder to convert the
contract’s principal to a stream of income (the annuity) at the contract
holder’s option, this very rarely happens in actual practice (Sondergeld,
1997). Neither is this right given much attention in the product market-
ing process, since in most cases, the minimal contractually guaranteed
annuity rates are based upon very low interest rates (e.g. 3 percent) and
dynamically projected mortality tables. Thus if the contract were ever to
be annuitized, the applicable annuity factors would most likely be higher;
these more favorable factors would be used by the insurance company to
set payouts. Some companies have significant amounts of older business
outstanding with higher interest rate guarantees and mortality guarantees
that were not based on dynamically projected tables, thereby increasing the
value of the product’s annuitization option to policyholders. Neverthelss,
most of these options remain out of the money, and policyholders would
have to annuitize any in-the-money options to realize their value.
The issue of life insurer creditworthiness again grabbed headlines in 1991
with a rapid string of large insurer failures, including those of Executive Life
Insurance Company, Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, and First
Capital Life Insurance Company. The list was lengthened in 1994 and again
in 1995 with the respective failures of Confederation Life Insurance Com-
pany and the holding company of Southwestern Life Corporation. Several
other companies have also failed.
There are a number of themes common to these failures that provide
valuable lessons. Many of these companies, for instance, had a product pro-
file that was heavily weighted toward ‘‘spread-based’’ products such as SPDA
and guaranteed investment contracts (GIC). They also often had short dated
liabilities funded with insufficiently liquid and/or higher risk asset classes
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such as commercial mortgage loans, real estate, less-liquid private place-
ments, or below-investment-grade bonds. Other problems included high
leverage, regulatory issues, poor underwriting results, fraud, and problems
in subsidiary or affiliate operations (Maloney, 1999).
The insurance industry has done much to improve the asset side of
its balance sheet since the early 1990s. Yet exceptions remain and old
risks continue to reappear in new products. In 1999, General American
sought protection when it became unable to meet its near-term obliga-
tions because of inadequate available short-term liquidity. The combination
of illiquid assets and liability optionality continue to represent a poten-
tially lethal combination that regulators and rating agencies must monitor
closely.
Applying These Lessons to the Payout Annuity Market
While the life insurance failures of the past provide valuable lessons, it is also
essential to anticipate future effects of changes in the industry’s risk profile.
For example, the importance of risks affiliated with the payout phase will
rise as companies’ liabilities become more concentrated in payout products,
especially if more optionality is added to these products.
In our opinion, risks tied to the following two guarantees will become
more prominent in the coming year.
Embedded Equity Guarantees
Many consumers planning for retirement seek equity market exposure with
some form of downside protection. Insurance companies are responding to
these demands with increasingly innovative product features such as guaran-
teed minimum income benefits (GMIB) and VIA with floors. Both of these
product options are further discussed below.
Aggressive Payout Annuity Guarantees
Aggressive mortality, interest rate, or equity guarantees could expose
insurers to material losses over the life of a payout annuity. These risks
are heightened if a company guarantees payment streams to be made far in
the future when there is increased uncertainty about the variables affecting
the guarantee.
Mis-pricings of the above guarantees are unlikely to result in a dramatic
‘‘run on the bank’’ scenario culminating in a company failure, except in
the most extreme cases. But a prolonged period of operating losses could
severely weaken a company’s capital position over time and reduce the
overall financial strength.
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Assessing Payout Annuity Market Opportunities
for Insurers
On the positive side, there are a number of reasons to believe that
the opportunity for insurers to meet retirees’ income demands will grow
significantly.
First, an aging population increases the demand for retirement products.
By the year 2025, reasonably conservative estimates are that the proportion
of the population aged over 65 in developed countries will increase to over
30 percent from just over 20 percent today. By 2050, this proportion will be
over 40 percent. Consistent with economic lifecycle models of saving and
consumption (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Yaari, 1965), this will increase
the demand for longevity insurance.
A second consideration is that the shift from defined benefit to defined
contribution retirement plans has resulted in retirees assuming increased
responsibility for meeting their retirement income needs. Instead of receiv-
ing a defined retirement income stream from the employer’s defined benefit
plan, more workers must personally manage their retirement funds during
the accumulation phase as well as during the retirement base. Some might
argue that employers---offering defined contribution plans would recognize
a responsibility to provide payout annuities, similar to the obligation to
provide a diversified set of risk and return investment opportunities within
a 401(k) plan. While this is not required, providing longevity protection
would appeal to offer substantial opportunity for growth in this market.
A third reason to expect market growth is that future retirees may not
receive scheduled Social Security benefits, which should boost the demand
for alternative retirement income resources. Deferred annuities, particu-
larly variable annuities, have been a phenomenal growth area for the US
insurance industry.
For all their success in selling variable annuities, however, insurers
have thus far had little success in persuading individuals to convert their
retirement funding accumulations into annuity streams, with the notable
exception of TIAA-CREF, rated Aaa for insurance financial strength. Our
best estimate is that the annuitization rate on variable annuities in the United
States is less than 5 percent. Increasing annuitization rates will be crucial if
insurance companies are going to retain the assets they have spent so much
time and effort to acquire.
Extensive competition has already developed over control of assets dur-
ing the accumulation phase. Section 1035 exchanges, allow an individual to
transfer funds without tax consequences between two different insurance
contracts, and these have noticeably negatively impacted the profitabil-
ity of some large variable annuity writers. The Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) also made it easier for
participants to transfer funds out of 457 and 403(b) plans, further enticing
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insurance companies to find ways to retain assets through means such as
annuitization.
In order for the payout annuity market to reach its full potential, how-
ever, the industry will have to convince distributors---including insurance
agents, financial planners, and brokers---of the important role that payout
annuities can fulfill in meeting client needs, and adequately reward them
for their efforts to sell the product. When selling a payout annuity, a fin-
ancial advisor gives up the valuable option to generate additional revenue
from the account in the future, which can reduce the incentive to suggest
such payout annuities. Companies have therefore been changing commis-
sion structures, by adding ‘‘trail commissions,’’ to make immediate annuities
more attractive to distributors.
The Size of the Market
The payout annuity market can be broadly divided into the annuitization
and immediate annuity segments (Fenton and Hecht, 1999). As explained
below, each of these segments can be further subdivided into fixed and
variable payout annuity products. The ‘‘annuitization market’’ refers to the
conversion of a lump sum of funds from an existing insurance contract
into a defined payment stream. Note that we focus on the market in which
individuals have some element of control over their retirement assets, as
opposed to the traditional defined benefit pension plan. Annuitization is
not a source of new funds to the industry but rather assures the industry
continued retention of existing funds. Annuitizations in 2000 amounted
to approximately $14 billion in the US Sales from the structured settle-
ment and the terminal funding markets are not included in these numbers,
as these products are not included in our analysis (LIMRA International,
2000).
Immediate annuities are new annuity contracts that initiate a periodic
income payment at some predetermined point in time. Total sales of
individual immediate annuities for 2000 came to $3.8 billion (LIMRA Inter-
national, 2000). These figures exclude sales of TIAA-CREF, which had
approximately $49 billion of payout annuity reserves as of year-end, 2001,
including $17.7 billion of variable annuity reserves and $31.6 billion of
fixed annuity reserves. Sales of VIAs are growing at a much faster rate
than fixed annuity sales, although from a much lower base, as illustrated
in Table 14-1.
AQ: Ref.
not listed.
Pl. chk.
Along with equity participation, annuitants also want security. Floor guar-
antees are therefore becoming increasingly popular as a component of VIAs,
along with GMIB, in which the value of the option to annuitize at a guaran-
teed rate is dependent upon underlying account performance. Robinson
and Fliegelman (2000) examined the credit implications of GMIBs along
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TABLE 14-1 Annuity Sales Volume for US Market
Fixed SPIA Sales
(Billions $)
Immediate Variable Sales
(Billions $)
1993 2.7 ---
1994 2.6 ---
1995 ∗ ---
1996 3.0 0.2
1997 2.8 0.2
1998 2.4 0.3
1999 2.9 0.5
2000 3.0 0.8
Source: LIMRA International, 2000.
Note:
--- No data available.
∗Includes structured settlements.
This table lists the volume of annual sales for fixed SPIA and
VIA during the 8-year-period ending in the year 2000. Note
the increasing volume for VIA contracts during the last few
years.
with other annuity secondary guarantees, but there are inadequate data
with which to measure the current size of the VIA market. Further, there
is a widespread lack of consumer appreciation for the longevity-insurance
benefit of payout annuities.
The Role of an Immediate Annuity in Retirement
Financial advisors tend to envision a payout annuity as one element in the
retirement portfolio. Savings, social security, employer pension plans and
part-time work are additional financial resources for retirees. The com-
bination of these resources should allow retirees to meet their financial
goals, which include income required to maintain a desired standard of
living; preservation or growth of at least a portion of those assets; funds
available for emergency needs. While most consumers purchase life insur-
ance because they are afraid of dying too soon and thus leaving family and
loved ones in financial distress, older people buy immediate annuities
because they are afraid of outlasting their financial resources should they
live too long.
Immediate annuities (IA) provide valuable longevity insurance to the bene-
ficiary that cannot be replicated by other investments through the use of a
systematic withdrawal plan. Some payout annuities provide liquidity options
and even protection against inflation. We discuss both of these features later
in the chapter.
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TABLE 14-2 Survival Probabilities to Alternative Ages (%) Conditional on
Being Alive at 65
Survive
To Age
Survival Probabilities
Single Female Single Male At Least One from
a Married Couple
70 93.8 92.0 99.5
75 84.4 79.9 96.9
80 70.9 62.7 89.1
85 52.8 41.0% 72.2
90 31.6 19.6% 45.0
95 13.4 5.8 18.4
Note: This table lists the conditional probabilities of survival for a couple exactly 65 years
of age. For example, the probability that at least one of the two survive for 20 more
years, that is, to age 85, is 72.2 percent. Note that this number is far larger than the
probability that either of them individually survives to age 85.
Source: Based on Society of Actuaries RP2000 data (www.soa.org/research).
To provide a sense of mortality patterns, Table 14-2 illustrates how long an
individual can expect to live conditional on surviving to age 65. The first two
columns show the probabilities of survival to a specified age for an individual
female and an individual male, respectively. The last column shows the joint
probability that at least one person from a married couple (both currently
aged 65) will survive to the specified age. Interestingly enough age 85 is the
typical ‘‘assumed’’ life expectancy, in most retirement planning calculations
assuming that a lifetime annuity is not purchased. Table 14-2 shows that
such an assumption exposes the retiree to considerable risk: at age 85 over
50 percent of individual females and over 40 percent of individual males
alive at age 65, will still be alive by age 85. For married couples, the situation
is even worse, with at least one spouse still alive at age 85 in over 70% of
the cases. Consequently, if these individuals had used an age-85 life expect-
ancy to plan their retirement income needs, it his highly likely they would
exhaust their retirement resources (other than Social Security) while they
were still alive. This longevity risk ---the risk of outliving one’s resources---is
substantial and a main reason that we believe immediate annuities will grow
in popularity. Clearly, retirees can protect themselves against this risk by
purchasing protection from an insurance company.
The Role of the Law of Large Numbers in
the Payout Annuity Market
Purchasing a fixed IA involves paying a nonrefundable lump sum to an
insurance company in exchange for a series of periodic payments, usually
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monthly. With some products, the payments end after a pre-determined
fixed period; these are called fixed-term (or period certain) annuities. With
pure life-contingent annuity products, the income ends only upon death
of the annuitant(s). Each of these annuities can also incorporate a refund
of ‘‘unused’’ premiums upon death. Period certain and life contingency
payment streams can also be combined in a single product, such as 20-year
certain plus life.
Now, consider a group of five 95-year-old women each worried about
outliving their retirement assets. US life tables show that there is a 20 percent
chance that a random 95-year-old (white) female will die during the next
year. Equivalently, in a large group of 95 year-old females, 20 percent of
them will not survive for another year.
To protect against outliving their assets, these five 95-year-old women
could enter into the following legally binding agreement. Each of the five
would then contribute $100 to a communal fund that will invest in Treas-
ury Bills yielding 5 percent. Then, according to the contract, at the end
of the year, the surviving females will be entitled to split the proceeds of
the fund.
The total contribution of 5*$100 = $500 will grow to $525 by the end of
the year. If all five females are still alive---at 96 years of age---they will each
receive $105. This is precisely their original $100 investment, plus interest.
Nevertheless, what happens if one of them, which is what is expected, dies
during the next year? The surviving four are entitled to split the $525, giving
each a payment of $131.25. The remaining four survivors have effectively
had a ‘‘return’’ of 31.25 percent on their investment. If two happen to die
during the year, the remaining three each get $175, for a 75 percent ‘‘return’’
on investment. In other words, the survivors’ returns consisted of their ori-
ginal principal, their interest, and a portion of the non-survivors principal
and interest. By pooling mortality risk and ceding bequests, everyone gains.
Technically, this agreement is called a tontine, also known as a participating
pure endowment contract or, in this example, a participating one-period
life annuity contract.
Of course, with only five women in the initial pool, the variation in
what could happen might be wide, although only six things can happen.
They might all die, and they all might survive or somewhere in between.
However, with 10,000 such females entering a one-period annuity agree-
ment, the statistical law of large numbers assures us that $1,050,000 will be split
amongst very close to 8,000 survivors. In other words, the expected return
from the contract---for the survivors---is (1,050,000/8,000) = 31.25 percent.
The numerator is the total final value of the pool, and the denominator
represents the survivors. The difference between the 5% return available
in the market, and the 31.25% earned by the survivors are mortality credits.
The higher the probability of death---that is the lower the expected num-
ber of survivors---the greater are the expected mortality credits. As one can
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TABLE 14-3 Investment Returns Required to Exceed Annuity
Implicit Return Assuming Survival
Age Death Probability Required Return (%)
55 2.26/1000 6.2
65 5.76/1000 6.6
75 16.34/1000 7.8
85 54.05/1000 12.1
90 95.84/1000 17.2
Note: This table displays the investment rate if return that is required to
beat the implicit return from a fixed immediate annuity (FIA) at various
ages, assuming a 6% interest rate pricing environment. Thus, for example, a
65-year-old (male) would only have to earn 6.6% during the next year, to end-
up in a better position, compared to purchasing the fixed annuity. However,
the same individual at age 95 would have to earn a (virtually impossible)
17.2% to beat the fixed annuity. Thus, the fixed annuity is relatively more
attractive at higher ages. Assumptions: R = 6%, load =0%, IAM1996 Table.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
see from Table 14-3, at high ages it becomes virtually impossible to beat the
implied mortality credits within a payout annuity through investment alone.
In theory, at younger ages it makes little sense for individuals to enter
into an immediate annuity contract since the mortality credits are relat-
ively low, and one can usually ‘‘beat’’ the implied returns through lower
expense products or the using of alternative higher return asset classes.
In practice, only insurance companies are typically allowed to create and
manage such agreements to provide these mortality-contingent products.
Most insurers go one step further and guarantee that annuitants receive
a mortality credit enhancement, even if the mortality experience of the
participants is worse (from the insurer’s perspective) than expected, for
example, if the participants live longer than expected. How can an insurer
provide this guarantee? It does so by making careful and conservative
assumptions about the rate of return earned on assets and the expected
mortality experience. Furthermore, the greater the number of IAs an insur-
ance company has on its books, the lower the risk of providing this mortality
guarantee.
These are the ultimate economies of scale. In other words, the risk to
the insurer might be significant if it sold only five such policies, but with
half a million policies, the probability of significant statistical fluctuations
becomes negligible. This, once again, is a direct result of the law of large
numbers. It is important to stress, however, that there are two distinct cat-
egories of mortality risk that an insurance company faces when selling the
payout annuity. The first type can best be described as a ‘‘small sample’’
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risk. It reflects the chance that any particular annuitant will live longer
than average. When faced with such a client, the insurance company is
confronted with a payment stream that is longer than originally expected
based on annuitant mortality rates. Actuarial theory has long established
that this particular risk can be eliminated---and therefore should not be
priced---by selling enough identical policies and taking advantage of the law
of large numbers. Therefore, if enough policies are sold, the realization will
converge to the expected.
The second type of risk is a subtler one. It is the risk that the insurance
company overestimate the population’s force of mortality, or, to put it in lay-
man’s language, that societal and medical changes will significantly lengthen
average life expectations. The company can also misestimate the makeup
of its customer base, selling to annuitants living longer than projected in
pricing. This type of longevity risk cannot be easily hedged by appealing to
the law of large numbers and selling more payout annuities.
Some insurance companies act as intermediaries but do not assume mor-
tality or investment risk. Participating immediate annuities are structured
so that individuals share with the insurer any unexpected favorable or unfa-
vorable investment returns or mortality experience. Participating annuities
shift a substantial part of the risk from the insurance company to the par-
ticipant. The experience is not passed on immediately, but rather is borne
by the annuitant pool and smoothed by the insurance company over a long
time horizon. The provision is akin to the difference between a defined
contribution and defined benefit pension plan. Both are meant to provide
a pension, but the risk allocation mechanism is different. Indeed, the par-
ticipating annuity structure greatly reduces the longevity risk to which the
insurer is exposed.
An Engine for Future Growth? Variable
Immediate Annuities
VIA are annuities with payments linked to the performance of a pool of
underlying investments. By contrast, fixed annuity payments are set at
issuance and are guaranteed by the insurance company, regardless of its
investment or other experience. VIAs have increased in popularity and rep-
resent attractive potential since companies can earn a higher return on
invested capital through a VIA than they can on a fixed annuity.
Though VIA payments may vary with any index or underlying investment,
in this chapter we concentrate on VIAs backed by equity investments. Essen-
tially, the principles of VIA are the same as those for a fixed annuity, except
that the annuitants do not know in advance what the fund/pool will earn.
Annuitants realize their investment returns only at the end of the year, and
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TABLE 14-4 How A Variable Immediate Annuity Works: Monthly
Payment Per $100,000 Premium + Unisex Age 55
AIR (%) Initial −20% 0% +20%
4 $440 $334 $422 $510
5 $500 $374 $474 $574
6 $560 $415 $527 $639
Note: This table displays the initial and subsequent payments from a VIA under
various market scenarios, and with a particular AIR selected in advance. For
example, if a 6% AIR is chosen, the initial payment will be $560 per month at
age 55. Subsequently, if the market declines by 20% during the next year, the
payment at age 56 will be reduced to $415 per month.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
then they split the gains among pool survivors. In the event that the invest-
ment earns a negative return (loses money), participants will also share in
the losses, but the effect will be mitigated by the mortality credits.
All VIAs use an assumed investment return (AIR) to establish payout
levels. Some VIAs allow the individual to select their own AIR, typically
between 3 and 7 percent annually. Most commonly, contractholders elect
a 5-percent return. To the extent that actual returns differ from the AIR,
future payments are adjusted accordingly. Table 14-4 illustrates how this
works.
For example, if an AIR of 4 percent is used, then a premium of $100,000
might produce an initial monthly payment of approximately $440. Sub-
sequently, if the underlying market index dropped by 20 percent during
the next year, the new payment would be $334, which---ignoring monthly
compounding effects---is roughly $440 × (1 − 0.2)/(1 + 0.04). Note that
the return, 20 percent in this case, is net of all expenses, including
both fund level and contract expenses. On the other hand, if the market
increased by 20 percent, the monthly payment would be $510, or roughly
$440×(1+0.2)/(1+0.04). Each year, the new payment becomes the bench-
mark, and the process begins anew. Technically, the 4-percent AIR functions
as a ‘‘hurdle rate’’ above which payments are increased and below which
payments are reduced. By contrast, if a higher AIR is selected, the initial
payment is higher, but the hurdle rate is higher as well. Payments will only
increase in subsequent years if the underlying index increases by more than
the AIR.
The important point is that companies do not have basis risk on their
investments, since investment guarantees are based on the actual return.
But the insurer’s profitability is still heavily influenced by market perform-
ance. To provide more payment stability to the recipient, some companies
are now changing in the amount paid only once each year. In addition,
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market innovations have included creating floors to limit the downside and
offsetting ceilings to restrict participation on the upside.
Risks in the Payout Annuity Market
Key risks to annuity providers include longevity and investment risk. Further,
annuities may offer contractholders the right to receive surrender payments
and obtain a commuted value, which creates even greater uncertainty for
the insurance company concerning future cash flows.
Companies that do not properly price mortality and investment or equity
market risk may not meet their profitability targets or worse. Our conver-
sations with companies suggested that their post-tax returns on investment
targets are typically 10--12 percent for fixed annuities, and over 15 percent
for VIAs. The worst-case scenario for offerers of fixed annuities would be a
prolonged declining interest rate environment combined with unexpected
longevity improvements. For VIAs, a decline in the equity markets would
also lower fees earned and could also trigger a minimum payout guarantee.
In what follows, we break down the various pricing elements and compare
them to actual results. We also evaluate if a company offering a particular
annuity product will be able to withstand unlikely scenarios that it may not
have considered during pricing.
The Nature and Pricing of Mortality Risk
The sustainability of past mortality improvement has been a subject of sub-
stantial debate (Carnes and Olshansky, 1998). The value of annuity payouts
may have been rising, of late because companies are not taking full mortality
improvement into account (Poterba and Warshawky, 2001).
Appropriate mortality assumptions to use for pricing purposes depend
on the universe of potential applicants. Companies offering annuities to
the general public should expect a degree of adverse selection, as healthy
applicants are naturally more likely to purchase longevity protection. Brown,
Warshawsky, and Poterba (2001) measure the value of adverse selection at
approximately 12 percent of premium for a 65-year-old man. Companies
offering annuities to qualified pension plans must also consider the plans
expected male/female ratio, since by law they must price using unisex mor-
tality rates. Women benefit from purchasing annuities based on a unisex
table so, a higher than expected ratio of women purchasers would reduce
insurer profitability.
So, What Happens if Science Finds a Cure for
Cancer and Heart Disease?
Clearly, the impact of major longevity improvements will depend on the
exact timing and magnitude of scientific and medical breakthroughs.
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TABLE 14-5 Impact of Alternative Assumptions on Single Premium
Immediate Annuity Issue Age
Mortality ∗Reduction Life Expectancy Spread
(%)
Unisex 55 Unisex 62 Unisex 70
Status Quo 0 82.9 +100 bp 83.8 +100 bp 85.6 +100 bp
Stroke and −10 83.8 +85 bp 84.7 +77 bp 86.4 +60 bp
Pneumonia
Cancer and −40 87.4 +39 bp 88.1 +4 bp 89.4 −67 bp
Diabetes
Heart Disease −80 97.7 −36 bp 97.9 −111 bp 98.6 −257 bp
Note: This table displays the ex post spread that would be earned from single premium
immediate annuity block of business, assuming an ex ante desired spread of 100 bps.
Thus, for example, if life annuities were sold to a 62-year-old with the intention of
earning a spread of 100 bps, then a 10% aggregate reduction in mortality (from the
elimination of strokes and pneumonia) would reduce the spread to 77 bps.
Source: Authors’ computations.
To quantify the effect of a substantial breakthrough on an insurance com-
pany’s profitability, we have developed a simple pricing model (explained
more fully in the Appendix).
Table 14-5 illustrates the impact of an unexpected improvement in life
expectancy, driven by a constant proportional reduction in the force of mor-
tality (hazard rate). These ratios roughly coincide with the average causes
of death.1
AQ: Pl.
indicate
what ‘*’
stands for.
To gauge the impact of major mortality improvements, imagine a situ-
ation in which a life annuity is issued and priced at age 62, with a 100 bp
profit margin, assuming the SOA 1994 GAM (static, unisex) table captures
the underlying population. The life expectancy at the issue age of 62 is 83.8,
which is the life expectancy with no mortality improvement other than that
already built into the actual table used to price the annuity, and the ex ante
profit spread is 100 bp If, however, there were suddenly an unexpected mor-
tality improvement, the firm’s ex post profit spread will clearly be reduced:
the question is, ‘‘by how much?’’
To answer this we must look a bit more closely at the precise causes of
death. At advanced ages, approximately 10 percent of deaths can be attrib-
uted to strokes together with pneumonia, an additional 30 percent can be
attributed to cancer and diabetes, 40 percent is due to heart disease, and
the remaining 20 percent are accidents, suicide, and formally classified as
‘‘others’’ (Society of Actuaries, 1996). Likewise, the exact fraction will
depend on the population in question, its sex composition, and ages at
death. For now, we assume that the fractions are constant.
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To evaluate the breakthrough scenario, we imagine that science found a
cure to all strokes and pneumonia, reducing the force of mortality at each
age by a factor of 10 percent. Curing cancer and diabetes lowers mortality by
40 percent, and eliminating heart decease, lowers mortality by 80 percent.2
Thus, at each age, a fixed fraction of deaths is eliminated as a proxy for the
reduction in various decrements.3
It is interesting that, the higher the issue age, the greater the impact on
profitability of a given percentage improvement in mortality. For example,
reducing cancer and diabetes (f = −40 percent), will still leave the insurer
with a profit spread of+39 bp at issue age 55, but a−67 bp spread at issue age
70. One can do the same exercise with an individual annuity mortality table,
such as the IAM or with some form of dynamic projection, and obtain results
on the same order of magnitude. It is also interesting that an 80 percent
reduction in the mortality rates, (by virtually eliminating of cancer, stroke,
pneumonia, and heart disease, adds only 10--15 years to human life. Altern-
atively, a 62 (unisex) year-old annuitant with a current life expectancy of
age 83.8, would have to experience a 98 percent reduction in the force of
mortality at all future ages, to expect to live to the biblical upper-bound of
120 years of age.4
Regardless of the actual methodology, the marginal impact is greater the
older the issue-age of the business. In other words, at younger ages, the
impact of a fixed percent reduction in mortality is lessened. More generally,
it is essential to look closely at the process of determining mortality and the
mortality improvement used in pricing insurance products, as well as the
weighting of company and industry data.
Investment Risk
In developing an investment strategy for non-indexed fixed payout annu-
ities, an investment manager is faced with the challenge of meeting fixed
payments for an uncertain period. Insurers will take different degrees of
investment risk to meet alternative pricing objectives. Credit defaults and
assumed reinvestment interest rates are two key variables that insurers must
consider.
Insurance companies typically invest primarily in bonds and other fixed
income instruments. To attain high yields required to be competitive in
issuing payout annuities, companies can purchase higher-yielding, lower
credit-quality assets, or invest in markets such as private placements and
commercial mortgages that offer incremental income. Clearly, defaults can
have a material impact on profitability. A declining interest rate environ-
ment, combined with greater than anticipated mortality improvements,
may also materially impact an insurer’s profitability, particularly when the
insurer is deploying shorter duration assets to back longer duration payout
annuities. A dearth of attractive long-term assets can lead insurers to accept
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this kind of investment risk. Conversely, for firms invested in long, illiquid
assets, a rise in interest rates could negatively impact profitability. Compan-
ies caught in this position may need to liquidate depreciated assets to meet
payments.
Commutation Rights
In response to market demands, some insurers have offered annuitants the
right to commute, or end, their contracts and receive at least a portion
of their future annuity payments up front. In order to protect themselves
against adverse selection from annuitants in ill health, insurers normally
only permit commutation for a limited portion of the period’s annuity pay-
ments. In these situations, insurers can control asset-liability mismatches by
applying a market value adjustment (MVA) to the commutation. For a fixed
annuity with an MVA, the discount rate used in determining the present
value of future payments would be linked to a current market rate such as
the 10-year Treasury rate. Unamortized expenses of the insurer would typ-
ically be protected by also applying a surrender charge that grades down
over time.
Few companies offer the right to commute life contingent payments,
mainly because of complications in determining the appropriate discount
rate, the uncertainty of which is driven by mortality. The most common
method to address the risk of adverse selection is to underwrite each annu-
itant seeking to commute life contingent payments. Companies offering
such a feature must carefully consider all risks, including expense and legal
ramifications.
The complicated nature of the product as compared to a straight annuity,
implies that administration and sales training costs may be sizable. To protect
against potential sales misconduct charges, firms must take steps to ensure
that contractholders fully understand the commutation process. We believe
that life contingent commutations will remain infrequent because of the
complexities involved. Insurers may offer customers the ability to acquire
offsetting life insurance, and to borrow against the ‘‘death benefit.’’ This will
allow annuitants to unlock the payment streams, albeit with a loan backed by
an insurance policy. Another innovative proposal is to underwrite and sell
long-term care insurance, together with life-contingent annuities, to offset
these risks.
Risks in the Variable Immediate Annuity Market
Companies offering VIA’s hedge against investment basis risk by linking
promised payments to the actual performance of investments supporting
the contract. An insurer’s VIA product fees are also based on the account
value, thereby linking the profitability of the product to the performance
of the underlying assets. Notwithstanding the performance of the equity
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markets, companies will remain exposed to longevity risk. Consider a block
of VIA experiencing higher-than-anticipated equity market appreciation,
along with unexpected mortality improvements. Fees paid to the insurer
will rise along with the associated assets, but the positive financial impact on
the insurer of the increased fees must be compared with the negative impact
of the increased longevity, which requires that the payments be made for a
longer then expected period. The fact that a favorable equity market has
increased the size of the periodic payment magnifies the longevity risk to
the insurer. Conversely, lower-than-anticipated equity market performance
diminishes the fees paid to the insurer. In this case, however, the longevity
risk is not magnified by rising payments. In either case, an insurer can
help offset its financial exposure to equity market performance by basing
commissions paid to producers on the annuity payment stream.
Potential Liquidity Risks
Giving contract holders the ability to shift funds between the general account
and variable account can also present risks to an insurer. Specifically, the
possibility that policyholders might move between accounts en masse exposes
the insurer to liquidity risk: there may be a need to sell a large block of bonds
to fully fund the variable accounts.
Inflation-Indexed Payments
Companies offering inflation-indexed annuities must consider the basis
risk of investing for the indexed payment. For the few companies offering
annuity products indexed to the consumer price index, the scarcity of appro-
priate investments needs to be considered in the asset-liability management
process.
Managing Payout Annuity Risk
To quantify the risk of payout annuities to an insurer, it is important to
understand the incremental risk that these products add to a company’s
overall risk profile. For most insurers, payout annuities represent a very
small portion of overall risk. The cost required to reduce the risk exposure
from these products may not be justified. Nevertheless, prudence dictates
that companies should have a longer-term plan for keeping their risk man-
agement process up-to-date with expanding sales. Companies also need to
be sure that they are properly quantifying the risks in their products. This
is particularly true for products with so-called cliff risks. Such products may
meet pricing objectives in 99 percent of the scenarios, but they could still
have very negative financial results in the remaining rare scenario. This can
be the case with products such as a VIA or a product containing a GMIB.
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Benefits of Diversification
One way that an insurer can mitigate the longevity risk of its payout annu-
ity products is to take an offsetting position on mortality exposure though
its life insurance products. Since the target populations for the different
policies can be quite distinct, however, determining the diversification bene-
fits can be somewhat difficult. On the other hand, some debate whether
there are any substantial benefits from product diversification into IAs and
life insurance. This is because IAs are sold primarily to the elderly, while life
insurance is bought by the young and middle-aged. An increase in popula-
tion longevity will adversely impact the liabilities of the former but only
marginally influence the profitability of the latter. Furthermore, the dura-
tion and lapsation behavior of these differing liabilities are mismatched and
hence cannot properly hedge each other. Although the mismatch argument
might be true for (short) term life insurance policies, the argument is not
as clear for non-participating whole-life policies. Both policies are sensitive,
in opposing directions, to changes in the entire mortality table, albeit in
different magnitudes. The issue becomes one of locating a proper hedge
ratio in the face of uncertain mortality. In determining the ratio, one would
need to look at the mortality table as well as product design, incorporating
data on how susceptible a life insurance policy is to surrender. It is con-
ceivable that much of the immediate annuity longevity risk can, in fact, be
hedged using a properly calibrated portfolio of whole life insurance---even
if the target group is much younger (see Milevsky and Promislow, 2002).
For products with embedded equity guarantees, it may not be possible to
diversify away the associated risks. Here the insurance company must look
to other solutions, such as reinsurance.
Product Design as the First Line of Defense
Product design is the first and most important line of defense to protect an
insurer’s financial integrity and profitability. Often a simple product design
change can significantly reduce the product’s risk. For example, restricting
the investment options of living benefit annuities such as GMIBs or VIAs with
floors may reduce the volatility of returns and hence the value of the option
granted to the contractholder. If a product feature cannot be quantified or
hedged, it is simpler not to include it, irrespective of the demand. Doing
otherwise is a potentially dangerous proposition, particularly for potentially
expensive living benefit options.
Distributor and Customer Education
Increased education will be important to the success of the payout annu-
ity market in the future. As product complexity increases, education will
take on added importance, or else the potential for sales misconduct
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will rise. Contractholders must understand the consequences of being
re-underwritten for a life contingent commutation, specifically that he or
she will likely receive less money than if he or she were healthy.
Reinsurance Involvement to Map Out Risks
Reinsurance affords primary insurers access to the product design and mort-
ality expertise of the reinsurers. Thus far, the US reinsurance market for
fixed and variable payout annuities is poorly developed, mainly because of
an absence of significant demand; some major reinsurers are also unwilling
to accept longevity risk unless it is priced very conservatively. This is con-
sistent with the reinsurance communities’ expectation for steady mortality
improvements, as evidenced by aggressive rates offered on life insurance
contracts.
Looking ahead, the reinsurance market for payout annuities is likely to
expand as primary company exposure increases. Long tailed payout annu-
ity contracts may be attractive to offshore reinsurers that benefit from less
restrictive regulation and lower taxes. Because of the long-tailed nature
of payout annuity contracts, reinsurer strength will be an important risk
consideration.
Conclusion
As the baby boomers reach retirement age, insurers will continue to look
for ways to attract and retain retirement assets. Although payout annuity
sales in the United States remain modest compared to sales of other insur-
ance products, the benefits will be material for firms able to manage even a
small portion of the growing pool of retirement assets. Insurance companies
have prepared themselves for this growth by meeting consumer demands
for liquidity, equity market participation, and minimum payment guaran-
tees, with increasingly innovative products. As the market evolved, the next
challenge will be for providers to protect the promises made.
Appendix
On a basic level, one can represent the price of, or the insurance liability
created by, a $1-for-life annuity in the following manner:
ax = f (x, q, l, r, s)
In the above expression, x is the age at which the annuity is issued, l cap-
tures the expense loading, the vector q represents the mortality table, the
vector r represents a term structure (yield curve) of interest rate, and the
most critical variable s, is the profit spread. One can think of s as the differ-
ence between what the insurance company will earn on its assets, and what
it ‘‘credits’’ the annuitant, net of expenses. Intuitively, the annuity factor is
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decreasing in x, and r, but increasing in l and s. In other words, older people
pay less, and annuity factors are reduced in a higher interest rate environ-
ment. But, greater expenses and profit spreads will increase the price per
dollar.
For example, in a flat r = 6 percent yield-curve pricing model, one might
see a profit spread on the order of s = 1 percent, and a proportional expense
loading of l = 10 percent. In this simplified case---and with no fixed dollar
loading---the annuity factor for the price of (or the insurance liability created
by) a $1-for-life annuity would be:
ax = (1+ 0.1)
∞∑
t=1
(t px )
(1+ 0.06− 0.01)t ,
where the numerator is the well-known conditional probability of survival.
More precisely, if we use the Society of Actuaries 1994 Group Annuity Mor-
tality Table (static, unisex), the actual annuity factors would be 15.69, 13.73,
and 11.11, for ages 55, 62, and 70, respectively. Naturally, the younger the
issue age of the annuitant, the more they must pay (and the greater the
required reserves) for the same $1-for-life guarantee.
In practice, the annuitant acquires a single premium immediate annuity
(SPIA) with an initial sum of W , thus guaranteeing a life-annuity of W /ax
for life. For example, a 55-year-old with $100,000 would be entitled to an
annual income of $100, 000/15.69 = $6, 373 for life. In the event of a period-
certain guarantee, the annuity factors would be higher---since the survival
probability in the numerator would be set to a value of one during the guar-
antee period---and thus the annual income would be reduced in proportion
to the length of the guarantee.
This is, roughly speaking, how immediate annuity pricing is determined.
In practice, of course, the valuation rate would be applied in the denom-
inator to determine the required reserves, while the actual pricing would
more closely resemble the above. For our purposes, however, we deliberately
blur the distinction between pricing and valuation since we are interested
in the broader impact of unanticipated longevity risk. For now, we ima-
gine that every dollar of premium must be placed in reserves, but no more,
thus ignoring capital issues and any possible surplus strain created by stat-
utory valuation rates. The gap between the two will not change the main
argument.
Now, imagine that science finds a cure to a specified decrement such as
heart disease. In this case, the force of mortality would be reduced at each
age by a given factor of x percent. On a technical level, the revised force
of mortality would be related to the assumed pricing for mortality via the
relationship:
µ′x = (1+ f )µx ,
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where f < 0 represents the fractional reduction in mortality. We stress
once again that we are approximating reality somewhat by assuming that a
constant fraction f of deaths for any given age can be attributed to a specific
illness, as opposed to an age-related fraction fx . In practice, the number
would vary. But, for our purposes we are interested in the effect of mortality
improvements, as opposed to the reasons for these improvements, per se.
Furthermore, assuming the improvement occurs immediately after the
annuity is issued, sold or priced, the true annuity factor should have been:
a ′x = f (x, q′, l, r, s),
where the prime symbol above the q denotes the true mortality vector.
Ceteris paribus, for any given x, l, r, and s, the true annuity factor should
have been higher for any given decline in the mortality rates.
The final step of our pricing analysis is to invert and solve for the profit
spread that equates the original annuity factor that was originally used to
price the annuity and the true (higher) annuity factor:
max s ′
s.t. f (x, q, l, r, s) = f (x, q′, l, r, s′)
Mathematically, we are solving for the largest profit spread that equates the
two annuity factors. Naturally, for any given level of mortality improvement,
s′ < s, and if the improvement is large enough (i.e. f  0), the implied
spread might be negative.
Notes
1Prices and reserves are based on the Gompertz approximation to 1994 GAM (static
table), 10 percent expense loading, and a 6 percent (minus the profit spread) flat dis-
counting. For example, if the annuity is issued at age 62, and mortality subsequently
declined by 40 percent, the book of business will earn only four (b.p.), as opposed
to the 100 bp used in pricing.
2From a technical viewpoint, the revised force of mortality would be related to the
assumed pricing for mortality via the relationship:
µ′x = (1+ f )µx ,
where f < 0 represents the fractional reduction in mortality. When we reduce
mortality, each and every qx rate in the appropriate cohort table used to price the
annuity is reduced by 10, 40, and 80 percent, respectively. For example, under an
f = −10 percent shock immediately upon issuing the annuity, the modified cohort
probability of a 55-year-old surviving to age 59, would be approximately:
(1− (0.9)q55) x (1− (0.9)q56) x (1− (0.9)q57) x (1− (0.9)q58).
3In practice, of course, a properly detailed methodology would involve reducing
each and every qx by the fraction of deaths caused by any particular factor. We use
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the word approximately above, because the actual mortality adjustment would have
to take account of fractional age payment by perturbing the instantaneous hazard
rate, as opposed to the qx values themselves.
4An alternative way of interpreting the above table is to convert the so-called spreads,
into a pre-tax internal rate of return (IRR) on investments; Appendix B illustrates
this approach.
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